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Abstract: This paper aims at explaining two stylized facts of the Lost Decade in Japan: rising wage inequalities 
and increasing firm-level productivity differentials. We build a model where firms can choose between 
efficiency wages with endogenous effort and competitive wages, and show that it can replicate those facts. Using 
Japanese microeconomic data, we find support for the existence of efficiency wages in one group of firms and 
competitive wages in the other group. Based on those results, a simulation shows that the share of firms using 
efficiency wages has declined, within sectors, during the Lost Decade, as predicted by the model.  
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1. Introduction 
 
While the Japanese economy is famous for the deflation it has experienced in the last 
ten years, less attention has been given to the real side of the economy. Two major stylized 
facts characterized Japan during the Lost Decade (1992-2004): rising wage inequalities and 
increasing productivity differentials at the firm level. Both evolutions occurred against the 
backdrop of a slowdown in aggregate productivity. This paper proposes an explanation for 
those real developments. We argue that wage inequalities are the flip side of productivity 
differentials which  themselves  originated  from choosing  different models  of work 
organization as a reaction to the productivity slowdown. 
Our contribution is twofold. First, we build a simple efficiency wage model with two 
types of firms differing by their compensation scheme and associated incentive mechanisms. 
We show that a negative aggregate productivity shock leads to different reactions of both 
types of firms and, consequently, to increasing productivity and wage differentials. Second, 
we conduct an empirical investigation with a Japanese matched employer-employee dataset. 
We show that firms can be divided into two groups: one group with efficiency wages, and 
another paying competitive wages, consistent with the model.  
Substantial increases in wage inequalities have been observed for more than two 
decades  in a wide range of countries, including the US, the  UK and many  other OECD 
countries. This has given birth to a sizable literature, which first reached the consensus that 
skill-biased-technological change was the main factor driving inequalities in the late 1990s 
and the early 2000s. As emphasized by Machin (2008), the topic has seen a recent renewal of 
interest as a result of several developments.  Among them, the  fact that some countries, 
previously characterized by relatively stable wage structures, have started to experience rising 
wage inequalities certainly deserves a new generation of research.  
Together with Germany, Japan is one of these countries. Whether income inequalities 
have really widened in Japan during the 1990s and onward has first been the subject of a 
debate but recent evidence shows that wage inequalities across male workers with similar 
characteristics have increased (Kambayashi et al., 2008).  
To explain these rising “within-group”  inequalities, it is natural to turn to firms’ 
characteristics. A well established stylized fact in Japan is indeed the increased dispersion of 
productivity at the firm level (Fukao & Kwon, 2006; Ito & Lechevalier, 2009). Surprisingly, 
these two facts have never been connected in the literature. This paper tries to fill the gap. We   3 
adopt a perspective similar to Faggio et al. (2010) or Mortensen (2003) and analyse the link 
between rising wage inequalities and increasing productivity dispersion at the firm level.  
Our explanation for rising wage inequalities focuses on labor market mechanisms and 
firms’ heterogeneity with regard to the choice of their organizational structure. By doing so, 
we abstract from other factors such as the impact of technical progress or  the 
internationalization of the economy. In the model, firms can choose between two types of 
work organizations, a complex structure with workers’ involvement and job security where 
the productivity of workers depend on their effort (type-I firms), and a simple competitive 
structure where workers have an exogenous productivity (type-II firms).
2
In the empirical part of the paper, we match for the first time the Basic Survey on 
Wage Structure and the Employment Trend Survey for the years 2005-2009, in order to build 
a rich employer-employee dataset that allows  us to disentangle individual and firm 
determinants of wage inequalities.
 A key ingredient of 
the model is that type I-firms endogenously generate a continuous effort function, contrary to 
the standard efficiency wage model where effort is a discrete variable. With this assumption, 
adjustment to the productivity slowdown in type-I firms can take place through increased 
effort, consistent with the intensification of work that we document for Japan.  The  core 
mechanism we emphasize is the interaction between this endogenous effort and the free 
choice of the organizational structure. A decrease in aggregate productivity leads to a smaller 
share of type-I firms, whose employees provide a higher effort, get a higher wage premium 
and make these firms overall more productive in relative terms. 
3
                                                 
2 Thus, the difference between the two types of firms corresponds to different organizational models, as in Oï 
(1983), rather than to different monitoring technologies, as in Bulow and Summers (1986). 
 We test for the presence of efficiency wages by looking 
for a negative correlation across firms between job flows and the firm-specific wage premium, 
as predicted by the model. We find that the existence of such a correlation on average is not 
contradicted by our data. Next, we divide our sample of establishments into two groups by 
using the unknown regime switching regression à la Dickens and Lang. We find that a group 
of establishments can be characterized by efficiency wage mechanisms, whereas the other 
group cannot. This confirms the key mechanism underlying our explanation for the rising 
wage and productivity differential. Our identification assumption in the regime switching 
relies on differences between gross flows of male and female workers, which we argue is a 
good indicator of the extent to which (male) workers enjoy job security in Japanese firms. On 
the Japanese labor market, female workers are usually not part of the regular workforce but 
3 For the sake of simplicity, in this paper, we indifferently use the terms “firms” and “establishments”, although 
we are aware of the differences between these two units of analysis.    4 
are used by firms as a buffer, making them a natural benchmark for the flexible labor input 
that we associate with the competitive work organization. Our results are robust to an 
alternative specification based on the share of part-timers. We also do robustness checks to 
rule out alternative explanations of the correlation between wage premia and job flows, such 
as on-the-job search. Finally, we use the regime switching equation to simulate the evolution 
of the share of type-I firms and find that it decreased, within sector, at the beginning of the 
Lost Decade, consistent with the prediction of the model. These results suggest that our 
explanation based on efficiency wages and the heterogeneity of firms’ organizational structure 
is  a plausible candidate to account for the recent joint rise in productivity and wage 
differentials in Japan.  
  The rest of the paper is built as follows. In the next section, we describe some stylized 
facts that characterized the Japanese economy from the early 1990s on, focusing on the real 
side of the economy, in particular the rising wage and productivity differentials. Section 3 
then  discusses the recent literature that aimed at connecting wage and productivity 
differentials. Section 4 builds an efficiency wage model with the endogenous choice of 
organizational structure and shows that it accounts well for the stylized facts. Section 5 tests 
whether the efficiency wage mechanism embedded in the model is present in the data and 
identifies the two types of firms with an unknown regime switching regression. The final 
section concludes.  
 
 
2. Stylized Facts: the Japanese Lost Decade viewed from the real side of the economy 
 
The Lost Decade in Japan (1992-2004) has been infamous for the long-lasting effect of 
the burst of the financial and real estate bubbles and the inability of successive governments 
to deal with a crisis that has turned into a deflation (Mikitani & Posen, 2000). But the Lost 
Decade has also witnessed several important developments in the real side of the economy. 
This section reviews the major stylized facts (SF) that motivate our analysis. 
 
SF1: Aggregate productivity has slowed down during the Lost Decade. 
Although it is less known outside Japan than the deflationist episode, a major feature 
of the Lost Decade is the productivity slowdown at the aggregate level, which has been the 
focus of a lively academic debate in Japan. Between 1995 and 2004, the annual average gross 
value added growth has been 0.7% in Japan against 3.7% in the US, with a contribution of   5 
TFP growth of 0.4 and 1.7 respectively, whereas during the period 1980-1995 gross value 
added growth was 3.6% in Japan and 2.9% in the US with a contribution of TFP growth of 
1.2 and 0.5 respectively (Fukao & Miyagawa, 2007).
4
Hayashi and Prescott (2002) also conducts a growth accounting. Using their data, we 
can decompose the loss of 3.1 points of growth in per capita income between the periods 
1983-1991 and 1991-2000 into a loss of 2.2 points in TFP growth and a loss in 0.9 points in 
number of hours worked per capita, while the ratio of capital to hours worked slightly 
decreased (by 0.1 point).  
  
 
SF2: Productivity differentials across firms have increased, even after controlling for 
firm size and sector. 
Recent studies on Japan, using different datasets and different methodologies, have 
found an increasing productivity dispersion among Japanese firms during the ‘‘Lost Decade’’ 
(Fukao & Kwon (2006) or Ito & Lechevalier (2009, 2010), among others). Moreover, whereas 
Japan has been characterized by size and sector productivity differentials that were relatively 
higher than in other developed countries (Yoshikawa, 2008), these recent studies have 
emphasized productivity differentials for firms of similar size and belonging to the same 
narrowly defined sectors, which have also observed in other countries (Dosi et al., 2010).  
Ito & Lechevalier  (2009)  test whether the introduction of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) had an effect on the evolution of productivity differentials 
at the sectoral level. They find no statistically significant effect, which casts doubt on the 




 thus leaving room for other possible explanations.  
SF3:  Wage inequalities have substantially increased for workers with similar 
characteristics and between firms of the same size.   
Japan has experienced a significant increase of inequalities to become one of the most 
unequal countries of the OECD, when inequalities are measured through the Gini coefficient 
(OECD, 2006). This statement, now widely accepted, has first been the subject of an intense 
academic debate: until recently, there was no consensus regarding whether income inequality 
really widened during the 1990s and onward. For example, Tachibanaki (2005) claimed that 
                                                 
4 There have been debates on the origin of the productivity slowdown−demand (Yoshikawa, 2008) versus supply 
side (Hayashi & Prescott, 2002)−and its extent–manufacturing (Fukao et al., 2004) versus non manufacturing 
(Yoshikawa, 2008). 
5 As in Caselli (1999). See the next section for other references.   6 
income inequalities substantially rose during the 1980s and 1990s, with a Gini coefficient 
increasing from 0.278 in the mid-1980s (OECD average: 0.286)  to 0.314 in early 2000s 
(OECD average: 0.307). On the contrary, Ohtake (2005) argued that this observed increase in 
income inequalities was a statistical artifact largely driven by the aging population. Focusing 
on labor income, Kambayashi et al. (2008) reconciled both sides of the debate. Using micro 
data, they showed that the distribution of wages remained apparently stable as a result of two 
opposing trends: (i) declining between-group (defined by education, experience, tenure, and 
establishment size) wage inequality; but (ii) increasing within-group inequality among male 
workers.
   
The first candidate to explain this increasing wage gap is the introduction of individual 
performance-based systems, but it does not seem to have played an important role in Japan 
even though such systems have been experimented with.
6 The second candidate is related to 
the  wage differential between regular and non-regular workers.  The rising share of non-
regular workers, which has more than doubled in 20 years to reach more than a third of the 
workforce, has been indeed a popular explanation of rising inequalities in Japan, especially 
within firms  (Ota, 2005). A peculiarity of the Japanese labor market is that non-regular 
workers are mostly female while regular workers are mostly male, a fact that we will use later 
in our identification strategy.
7
However, the higher share of non-regular workers does not explain why wage 
inequalities have also increased between firms (Tachibanaki, 2005; Ito & Lechevalier, 2009). 
This has first gone unnoticed since the literature has first focused on firms of different size 
and found that firm-size differential does not explain the increasing wage gap  (e.g. 





SF4:  Work intensity has increased, especially in firms which adopted Toyota-style 
flexible production systems.  
                                                 
6 First, not all firms have tried to introduce such systems. Second, among those who have tried, many have 
abandoned them  after  a  while because of negative externalities. For example, in the case of Fujitsu, the 
introduction of individual performance-based scheme has been detrimental to the overall performance of the 
company due to the fact that individual performance is all the more difficult to observe in a working 
environment characterized by the pre-eminence  of team work. The current attempts at  reforming the wage 
system focus less on setting individual performance-based wage schemes than on  modifying deferred 
compensation schemes to allow employees to get short term reward for their engagement in the firm, in a context 
of rising risks and uncertainty (Fujimura, 2003). 
7 According to 2007 Employment Status Survey, female workers represented 74.3% of non-regular workers aged 
15 to 59 and 30.3% of regular workers. 
8 The focus on wage differential between firms of different size is understandable in a country that has been (and 
still is to a certain extent) characterized by a dual structure along the firm size.   7 
Although labor productivity growth has tended to slowdown, there is some evidence 
that work intensity has increased. Signs of rising work intensity can be captured through 




 For example, according to a Governmental Report on Workers’ Accident 
Compensation (2011), the number of claims of industrial accidents per ten-thousand workers 
has increased from 0.149 in 2001 to 0.317 in 2010. Moreover, since 2007, the number of 
claims related to psychological diseases corresponds to more than 50% of the total number of 
claims, whereas it was only 1/3 of the total number of cases in 2001. Finally, although it has 
not been systematically investigated yet, the anecdotal evidence suggests that these problems 
concern more particularly firms  who adopted  new  human resource  practices and work 
organizational models, such as the Toyota-style flexible production system (Lechevalier, 
2005). 
Given those stylized facts, it is tempting to explain the rising wage inequalities(SF3), 
especially between firms, by the increased between-firm productivity differentials (SF2), as it 
has been done by the existing literature in the case of other countries (see next section). The 
present paper aims at studying this link in a way that is consistent with the two other stylized 
facts. Surprisingly, there has been no recent investigation of between-firms wage dispersion in 
connection with productivity differentials. One reason for the absence of this type of study 
might be the assumption of friction-less labor markets which does not allow for any 
connection between wage differential and productivity differential other than human capital. 
Another possible reason is the concern for within-firm wage differential between regular and 
non-regular workers described above, or the fact that studies which have looked at between-
firm inequality have focused on firms with different sizes, which failed to explain  the 
increasing wage gap as mentioned above.  
 
 
3. Review of the literature on productivity and wage differentials  
 
                                                 
9 The increased number of hours has sometimes been proposed as an alternative proxy for work effort. This has 
been criticized by various authors, including Green (2004) or Askenazy (2004), who point out that a reduction in 
working hours can actually be associated with the intensification of work effort. This is particularly relevant for 
Japan. The typical response of Japanese firms to negative shocks is indeed labor hoarding and reduction of 
working hours (Abraham & Houseman, 1989), as has been observed during the Lost Decade. Using the number 
of hours worked as a proxy for effort would lead to the conclusion that work effort has decreased whereas our 
indicators suggests the opposite.    8 
In addition to the stylized facts described above, this paper is motivated by a large 
body of literature, both empirical and theoretical, that investigated the relationship between 
productivity and wage differentials.  
On the empirical side, several studies have shown that variations in wages can be 
explained by cross-firms differences in wage policy and productivity, using Danish, US or 
UK data (Mortensen, 2003; Dunne & al., 2004; Faggio & al. 2010). The correlation between 
wage and productivity differentials in different countries is now a well established stylized 
fact.  
Several theoretical mechanisms have been suggested to generate this link between 
productivity and wage differentialS. A first and obvious explanation relies on differences in 
human capital (Haltiwanger et al. 1999). 
A sizable literature focuses instead on the role of technology. Caselli (1999) explains 
the growing wage differential by different rates of technological adoption. He builds a model 
where the adoption of new technologies together with different learning abilities of workers 
results in both different wages and different capital-labor ratios. In Leonardi (2007), the 
falling price of equipment results in a more dispersed distribution of capital-labor across firms. 
This, together with a search model of the labor market, generates an increased dispersion of 
wages for ex ante identical workers. Empirical work by Dunne & al. (2004) for the US and 
Faggio & al. (2010) for the UK have confirmed the link between wage and productivity 
differentials on the one hand and the rate of technology adoption on the other hand. Leamer 
(1999) builds a two-sector Hecksher-Ohlin model with variable effort from workers and 
shows that effort and wages are higher in the more capital-intensive sector.  
Finally, many papers explain this link by labor market mechanisms. Layard et al. 
(2005) review a range of models of imperfect labor markets that are able to generate wage and 
productivity differentials—union bargaining, efficiency wage, rent-sharing, or search-based.  
While the mechanisms described above are relevant for many OECD countries, they 
do not fit well the Japanese stylized facts described in section 2. According to SF3, wage 
inequalities are found across individuals with similar characteristics and are therefore unlikely 
to be explained by differences in human capital or in learning abilities as in Haltiwanger et al. 
(1999) or Caselli (1999). According to SF2, productivity differentials have been observed for 
firms of similar size and within narrowly defined sectors. Thus, explanations relying on 
sectoral differences (e.g. different capital-labor ratio as in Leamer, 1999) are not sufficient to 
account for them. The mechanism proposed by Leonardi (2007) for the US is able to generate 
an increased dispersion of wages and productivity within sectors but implies an increase in the   9 
capital-labor ratio of firms. As documented in SF1, the capital-labor ratio slightly slowed 
down in Japan during the Lost Decade. The adoption of better technologies should also be 
associated with a higher aggregate productivity whereas productivity growth has slowed down 
in Japan (SF1). More generally, in the case of Japan, wage inequalities are better explained by 
the characteristics of the labor market (Tachibanaki, 2005) than by differences in technology 
(Ito & Lechevalier, 2009). Finally, few of the models mentioned above, included those on 
labor market mechanisms, are able to generate the intensification of effort suggested by SF4. 
In the next section, we build an efficiency wage model where productivity and wage 
differentials stem from the endogenous choice of work organization by otherwise similar 
firms. This model is consistent with the four stylized facts described in section 2 and therefore 
overcomes the limits of the existing theoretical literature when applied to Japan. 
The increased diversity of human resources and management practices and its impact 
on effort and productivity differentials has been documented by Bloom & Van Reenen (2007, 
2011) for the US and Europe, and Valeyre (2004) for France. Green (2004) shows that, in the 
case of the UK, technological and organizational changes on the one hand, the use of high-
commitment human resources policies on the other hand, explain work intensification better 
than the reduction of union power or rising job insecurity. 
A prediction of the model that will play an important role in the empirical part of the 
paper is the correlation between wages and employment flows. This correlation has also been 
documented in other OECD countries. Using data from the State of Washington, Abowd et 
al. (2006) show that idiosyncratic wage policies of firms are closely related to observed 
patterns of worker and job flows at the firm level. Lazear & Shaw (2008) show that a negative 
correlation between workers’ flows and wage levels is a widespread stylized fact among ten 
OECD countries. On-the-job search offers an alternative theoretical explanation  for  this 
negative  correlation, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994):  workers in more  productive 
establishments do not have any incentive to search for another job, because they receive 
enough match-specific benefits. Therefore, voluntary quits in such establishments are lower, 
resulting in a negative correlation between gross flows and productivity. While this 
mechanism is relevant for voluntary quits, our efficiency wage mechanisms concerns 
involuntary quits. In Japan, the share of voluntary quits has drastically dropped since the mid-
1990s. In the empirical section, we show that our results are robust even when controlling for 
voluntary quits.  
 
   10 
4. An efficiency wage model with endogenous choice of organizational structure 
This section describes  a plausible mechanism to account for the stylized facts 
described in section 2. It introduces a simple efficiency wage model with endogenous effort 
and the endogenous choice of organizational structure. The model is able to reproduce all the 
stylized facts described above. Unfortunately, the lack of data makes it impossible to directly 
test all its predictions. However, the empirical part of the paper (section 5) will provide some 
support to the model by testing its main feature, the existence of efficiency wages in one 
group of firms.  
The framework we use is a simple extension of the classical model proposed by 
Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984), with two types of firms as in Bulow & Summers (1986).
10 This 
dualism corresponds to two alternative organizational structures. Some firms (type-I firms) 
implement a complex  organizational structure  with job security and where productivity 
depends on specific efforts from workers,  whereas other firms (type-II firms) behave 
competitively on the labor market and implement a simple organizational structure where 
workers have constant marginal productivity regardless of their effort. We assume that one 
firm equals one job.
11
Jobs in type-I firms require workers’ implication and efforts. Productivity in type-I 
firms, 
 Hence, the levels of employment in the two types of firms, L1 and L2, 
stem from the distribution of firms across the two productive models, which will be 
endogenous.  
1 m , is a concave function of the effort e. In order to get closed-form solutions, we 
assume a constant elasticity:   





) ( 1 =
  
         η<1  [1] 
where A is the economy-wide aggregate productivity. Type-I firms choose both the wage and 
the effort required to maximize profits, taking into account the possibility that workers can 
choose to shirk and not provide any effort. Shirkers are detected and fired with probability q. 
Non-shirkers enjoy job security: they only lose their job when the firm is hit by an exogenous 
separation shock, which happens with probability s. Then, the worker becomes unemployed 
and the firm exits the economy. The wage is used as an incentive mechanism to ensure that 
workers do not shirk. 
                                                 
10 Our main inspiration is Amable & Gatti (2004). 
11 The model then abstracts from the size of firms. As explained in section 2, the wage differential is not 
explained by heterogeneity between firms of different sizes.   11 
In type-II firms, no incentive is required: workers always have an exogenous 
productivity  µ A m = 2 . Contrary to type-I firms which offer job security, type-II firms are 
perfectly competitive. Workers freely choose between supplying their labor to type-II firms 
on the competitive spot labor market or being unemployed. Only unemployed workers can 
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where U is the number of unemployed.  
Unemployment benefits wu are financed by a tax raised on wages, with the following 
budget constraint: 
 




The tax rate t is exogenous. The total labor force is N, with 
 




Firms are free to choose their productive model, type I or type II. We also assume free 
entry of firms in the economy. 
The model is solved in three steps: 
•  Step 1: type-I firms choose the wage and the effort that maximize the value of the firm. 
•  Step 2: workers not employed in type-I firms freely choose between unemployment 
and a job in type-II firms, which determines wages in type-II firms. 
•  Step 3: firms freely enter the economy and choose their productive model (type-I or 
type-II), which determines employments in type-I and type-II firms, as well as the 
hiring rate a.  
 
As the efficiency wage block of the model (step 1) is standard, we put some of the derivations 
of the results in appendix A and keep here only what is necessary to our demonstration. The 
definition of all variables is summarized in table 1.  
 
Table 1: variables of the model 
 
VARIABLE  DEFINITION 
1 w ,  2 w   Wage in type-I and type-II firms 
1 L ,  2 L   Number of type-I firms and of type-II firms 
N , U   Total labor force, total unemployment 
                                                 
12 To write this equation, we have already taken into account the fact that workers will not shirk in equilibrium, 
hence the flow out of type-I firms is equal to sL1.   12 
u w   Unemployment benefits 
e  Effort of workers in type-I firms 
η  Elasticity of a worker’s productivity with respect to its effort 
a, s  Hiring and firing rates in type-I firms 
S V1 ,
NS V1 ,
U V , 2 V   Utilities of shirker in type-I firms, of non shirker in type-I firms, of 
unemployed, and of worker in type-II firms  
1 J ,  2 J   Values of a type-I and a type-II firm 
t  Tax rate raised on wages  
1 m ,  2 m   Productivity in type-I and type-II firms 
q  Probability of detecting shirker 
r   Interest rate 
µ   Idiosyncratic productivity in type-II firms 
A  Aggregate productivity 
 
 
Step 1: incentives and effort in type-I firms 
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Then, they choose the level of effort that maximizes the value of the firm subject to this 
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Profits’ maximization yields an endogenous effort function: 
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At the optimum, the positive effect on profits of a marginal increase in effort, and therefore 
productivity, would be exactly offset by the higher efficiency wage needed to get that higher 
effort. The fact that effort and productivity are endogenously determined by firms is a crucial 
aspect of the model. By contrast, standard models like Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) assume that 
effort is exogenous.    13 
Taken together, the efficiency wage [5] and the optimal level of effort [8] imply a 




























.  [9] 
 
Step 2: equilibrium wage in type-II firms 
Because type-II firms are perfectly competitive, workers can freely choose to either 
supply their labor to type-II firms or be unemployed. In equilibrium, the wage paid by type-II 
firms adjusts to make workers indifferent between unemployment and a job in a type-II firm 















From [5] and [10], we can derive the expression of the wage differential 
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The wage premium paid by type-I firms over type-II firms increases with the effort required 
from workers in type-I firms.  
 
Step 3: productive model and employment 
Finally, firms choose their productive model. In equilibrium, they should be 
indifferent between both models so that the value of a type-I firm should equal that of a type-










As there is free entry, this value is driven down to 0. We have J1 = J2 = 0, which gives: 
  1 1 ) ( w e m = ,  [13] 
  2 2 w m = .  [14] 
We can now define an equilibrium of the model. 
 
Definition  
An equilibrium is an allocation vector (L1, L2, U, e), a price vector (w1,w2,wu), and a hiring 
rate a, satisfying the flow equilibrium condition [2], the budget constraint [3], the labor 
resource constraint [4], the free entry conditions [13]  and  [14], the efficiency wage   14 
schedule [5], such that type-I firms choose optimally the level of effort [8] and workers are 
indifferent between unemployment and jobs in type-II firms [10].  
 
The following proposition describes the equilibrium of the model. 
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium) 
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Proof: See appendix A.  
 
The lower (upper) bound on A is necessary to get strictly positive employment in type-I (type-
II) firms L1 (L2). 
 
 
Discussion of the results 
In our framework, the productivity slowdown of the Lost Decade that we documented 
in SF1 can be modeled as a decrease in the aggregate productivity A. The proposition shows 
that this leads to lower hiring flows into type-I firms, a higher effort in type-I firms, and larger 
wage and productivity differentials between type-I and type-II firms, consistent with SF2, SF3, 
and SF4. 
The intuition for this result is the following. In a partial equilibrium framework, i.e. for 
a given hiring flow a, the direct effect of a lower aggregate productivity A is to lower the 
effort at the firm level (see equation [8]), which would depress the firm-level productivity 
m1(e)  in type-I firms even further than in type-II firms. However, there is a general 
equilibrium effect going in the opposite direction. Lower profits in type-I firms indeed lead to 
a reallocation of firms from a type-I to a type-II productive model. With a lower share of 
type-I firms, the hiring rate a then decreases (equation [2]). This in turns lowers the value of 
unemployment as it is now harder to find a job in type-I firm, making it profitable for type-I 
firms to increase the effort required. Indeed, equation [8] shows that the optimal effort is a 
decreasing function of the hiring rate. What proposition 1 shows is that this general   15 
equilibrium effect dominates so that the effort e increases when A decreases. This is consistent 
with SF4, which documents an increase in the intensification of work.  
From equation [11], a higher level of effort then means a larger wage differential, 
consistent with SF3, as well as a larger productivity differential between type-I and type-II 
firms, consistent with SF2.  
To sum it up, a decrease in aggregate productivity leads to a smaller number of type-I 
firms, providing a higher effort, getting a higher wage premium and making these firms 
overall more productive in relative terms. The fact that the relative productivity of type-I 
firms increases following the crisis is due to the interaction between the general equilibrium 
effect and the endogenous intensification of work in these firms.  
While this main result is consistent with the stylized facts presented in section 2, 
whether our efficiency wage mechanism is a satisfying model of the Japanese labor market is 
a matter of empirical investigation.
13 The empirical section of this article focuses on detecting 
efficiency wages in type-I firms and competitive wages in type-II firms.  According to 
equation [9], conditional on macro variables, efficiency wages in type-I firms are a decreasing 
function of the separation rate s. While the rate of inflow a is a macroeconomic variable (the 
probability for an unemployed to find a job in any type-I firm), the rate of outflow s is an 
idiosyncratic variable specific to each type-I firm.
14 Therefore, if the separation rate varies 
across firms, we expect to find a decreasing relationship between wages and separation rates 
in the cross-sectional dimension of micro data for type-I firms. On the contrary, type-II firms 
are perfectly competitive: their wage is pinned down by their exogenous productivity which is 
unrelated to employment flows.
15
Finally, firms in the model all have the same size and belong to the same sector. 
Therefore, the predictions of the model should be understood as holding within groups of 
sector and size and not for the entire economy. For example, the share of type-I firms could 
 Therefore, we do not expect any cross-sectional relationship 
between wages and employment flows for type-II firms. 
                                                 
13 The empirical strategy to detect efficiency wages may drastically vary depending on the exact nature of the 
model.  For example, Abe & Ohashi (2004) confirm the existence of efficiency wage model in Japan  by 
analyzing the steepness of wage profiles (the idea is that firms raise not only wage levels but also the steepness 
of wage profiles to prevent workers from shirking); Fuess & Millea (2002) use the Geweke linear feedback 
method to overcome a basic identification problem regarding the direction of causality between productivity 
gains and wage hikes. 
14 The rate of inflow a affects the efficiency wage through the value of unemployment, and hence stands for the 
probability of finding a job in any type-I firm, while the rate of outflow s affects the efficiency wage through the 
probability that the current employment relationship ends, and hence stands for the probability of being fired 
from by the current employer. See appendix A. 
15 From the assumption of perfect mobility between type-II firms and unemployment, transitions between jobs in 
type-II firms and unemployment occur at a potentially infinite rate.   16 
decrease within sectors and for firms of the same size but increase overall in the economy. 
This would be the case if a sector with a large share of type-I firms becomes larger relative to 
the rest of the economy. 
 
 
5. An empirical investigation with Japanese micro data 
 
5.1. Empirical strategy and dataset  
According to the model of the previous section, we should find a negative relationship 
between flows and wages in type-I firms (as in equation [9]), whereas there should be no such 
correlation in type-II firms. The goal of this empirical part is to try to explain the stylized 
facts mentioned in section 2, in particular productivity and wage differentials, by applying this 
dichotomy to the Japanese economy. 
Ideally, we would like to test the model by using a micro panel dataset including data 
on wages and employment flows. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, such a database is not 
publicly available in Japan. However, we had access to the Basic Survey on Wage Structure 
(BSWS) and the Employment Trend Survey (ETS) between the years 2005 and 2009. The 
first survey  provides  information on wages and the second on employment flows.  By 
matching those two datasets at the establishment level for each year, we get an employer-
employee dataset  with 9,007 establishments, a well-known type of data to address the 
question we are interested in (Abowd & Kramarz, 2001; Abowd et al., 1999). The sappendix 
describes the two initial databases, explains the matching process (appendix B), and provides 
summary statistics (appendix C).  
  Using this repeated cross-sectional data, we detect efficiency wages by showing the 
existence of a negative correlation between flows and wages. To do this, we first estimate a 
Mincerian wage equation for male regular workers with fixed effects on establishment. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly “base” wage rate of each worker (see below) 
and the explanatory variables are individual characteristics such as education, tenure, as well 
as dummies for prefectures (Kambayashi et al, 2008). The establishment fixed effect can be 
interpreted as the establishment-specific wage premium. According to the model, this fixed 
effect should be negatively correlated with the magnitude of outflows in type-I establishments. 
  In a second step, we use the unknown regime switching technique (Dickens & Lang, 
1985; Ishikawa & Dejima, 1994) to decompose the economy into two types of establishments. 
This methodology allows us not to set any explicit a priori  criterion  to define which   17 
establishment belongs to which type of firm.  This is a crucial point, since productivity 
dispersion has increased within groups of firms sharing similar characteristics such as size and 
industry (SF2). After having identified these two groups of firms, we can check whether there 
is  a  negative correlation between wage premia  and flows  in type-I firms, and no such 
correlation in type-II firms. 
  In a third step, we use the result of this estimation and public data with a longer time 
span to simulate the evolution of the share of type-I firms in the economy. This will allow us 
to confirm an additional prediction of the model. 
 
5.2 Detecting the existence of efficiency wage schemes 
  We start by checking whether there is a negative correlation between wage premia and 
employment flows in the data, as predicted by the model when firms adopt efficiency wage 
schemes.  
  First, according to a conventional procedure in the usage of the BSWS, we define an 
hourly “base” wage wijt as the wage, excluding various allowances, paid per scheduled hour 
worked by worker i, in establishment j at time t. The base wage thus excludes bonus payments 
and overtime work, which avoids a potential bias coming from unobservable temporary labor 
demand shocks. If the wage were computed using the total wage bill instead, such shocks 
would affect both the estimated wage premium and the labor flows.
16
  Second, we limit the sample to regular male workers in private firms with more than 




  Third, we regress year by year the log of the base wage on individual characteristics of 
human capital (such as educational level, age, tenure), and  prefecture dummies (Xijt),  in 




   (t=2005, …2009)  [15] 
                                                 
16 The Japanese legal regulation requires almost every employer to prepare “Workplace Rule” (Shugyo Kisoku), 
which specify ex ante the base wage and the number of hours worked in a written contract. Because it is not easy 
to modify the written contracts, ex post adjustments to temporary shocks are usually made by using bonus 
payments and overtime work. The base wage and hours reported in the survey are based on the wage and hours 
of the Workplace Rule. Therefore, the hourly base wages in our data are not directly affected by temporary 
shocks. 
17 Construction industry was not covered by ETS until 1990. In published tables, the disaggregated employment 
flows for different industries and -firm sizes are only available for firms with more than 30 employees.   18 
 
Here eijt is , the normally distributed error term given Xijt and ujt. If the human capital market 
is perfect, the establishment fixed effects ujt of [15] can be interpreted as the unobserved wage 
premium which a worker can enjoy just because he belongs to a specific establishment. 
  The next step is to look at the relationship between the predicted wage premium   
and employment flows.  Table  2 shows the negative statistical relationship between the 
predicted establishment effects and several kinds of flow ratios at the establishment level, 
controlling for industries, firm size and overtime ratio. This supports the predictions of [9] for 
the whole sample of firms. 
 
Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Flow Structure on Establishment Fixed 
Effects (1) Sample: 2005-2009 BSWS and ETS matched sample 















R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27






Note: Standard errors in parentheses, and *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Other explanatory variables include 
the average overtime ratio, 4 firm size dummies, 9 industry dummies and a constant. The inflow (outflow) ratio is 
the number of employees hired (fired) during a year divided by total employment at the beginning of the year. The 
gross flow ratio is the sum of the inflow and the outflow ratios. The excess flow ratio is the difference between the 
gross flow ratio and the absolute value of the employment growth rate. 
 
Although these results confirm the existence of an efficiency wage mechanism on 
average, the negative correlation may not be universal. This leads us to further investigate this 
issue by dividing the sample into two categories, type-I and type-II firms. 
 
5.3 Identifying two types of firms: a switching regression approach 
To divide the sample of firms into two tiers, a possibility would be to set up an a 
priori  criterion such as firm size or industry. However, adopting such an a priori 
classification might lead to misclassify some firms. More importantly, it rules out by 
assumption the possibility of within-group heterogeneity, for example the possibility that two 
firms with similar size or belonging to the same sector may choose different wage schemes 
and organizational structure. Allowing for within-group heterogeneity is important if one   19 
considers that previous studies, which have tried to link increasing productivity differentials 
to strategic choices of firms (such as investment in R&D or export behavior) have shown its 
importance (Ito & Lechevalier, 2010).  




. With this methodology, sample separation is a priori  unknown and the choice 
between two sectors becomes endogenous (Sousa-Poza, 2004). The system of estimation is, 
suppressing time dimension, as follows: 
 
and                                 ….(16) 
 
where 
 is the predicted fixed effect of establishment j of type k (I: type-I, II: type-II); 
sj is the separation rate of establishment j; 
Zj are control variables; 
 is a latent variable which splits the sample into two types of firms; 
Kj provides the key to identify the two types of firms. 
 
Because   is the predicted fixed effect of establishments and can be interpreted as a 
wage premium, industry and firm size should matter. Therefore, we include 9 industry 
dummies, 4 firm size dummies and year dummies as controls. As previously discussed,   
may also be affected by unobserved temporary demand shocks, causing omitted variable bias. 
This potential bias is already limited by the fact that we estimate the wage premium using the 
base wage, not the total wage bill (see above). In addition, we introduce the average overtime 
ratio within establishments to directly control for temporary demand shocks. 
The main issue, before estimating the system of equations (16), is to define the key to 
identify the two sectors, Kj. We propose to use the difference between gross flows of male 
and female employees. The reason for this identification strategy is the following. First, a 
distinctive feature of the Japanese labor market is that female workers are usually not part of 
the regular workforce but are used by firms as a buffer (Abraham and Houseman, 1989, 
                                                 
18 A well-known limit of this classical methodology, which has been already applied to the Japanese labor 
market by Ishikawa & Dejima (1994), is that it provides a test for dual labor markets and does not recognize the 
possibility of three segments. For the question we address in this paper, it is not a problem as we explicitly focus 
on the difference between two types of productive models.   20 
Houseman and Abraham, 1993). Accordingly, we identify female employees as a benchmark 
for the most flexible type of labor input. Then, if the gross flow of male employees is large 
compared to that of female employees belonging to the same firm, male workers are 
considered as a flexible labor input as well and the firm is classified as a type-II firm with a 
competitive work organization. If on the contrary, the gross flow of male employees is low 
compared to that of female employees, male workers are considered as enjoying job security 
and the firm is classified as a type-I firm.  
This identification strategy relies on the specificity of the Japanese labor market with 
regards to the dichotomy between male and female employees. Discrimination against female 
workers in Japan has been documented by the existing literature (Wakisaka, 1997; 
Tachibanaki, 2005). The gender gap in the labor market in Japan is one of the highest among 
OECD countries (OECD 2010, table 1.1, p.37). The fact that female workers are used as a 
buffer and thus displays larger gross flows is confirmed in our data set: the gross flow rate is 
higher on average and more volatile for female than for male regular workers (appendix D).
  
  Another option for the identification strategy may be to use the difference between 
gross flows of part-timers and full-timers within the same establishment. In this case, we 
would assume that an establishment which uses part-timers more flexibly than its full-timers 
is more likely to treat their full-timers as quasi-fixed input and could be considered as a type-I 
firm. However, using part-timer flows drastically limits the sample size and creates biases in 
the estimated results, because the use of part-timer is heavily concentrated on some 
establishments (small establishment and/or belonging to the service industry). The share of 
establishments  which do not use female regular worker is at most 12%, while the share 
without any part-timers is 44%. This makes it easier to econometrically identify the two types 
of firms that we theoretically distinguished using the dichotomy between male and female 
workers than the dichotomy between part-time  and  full-time  workers.  In addition, the 
category of full-time workers does not necessarily coincide with that of regular workers, as 
full-time workers can also be used as a buffer to protect the core workforce. Indeed, many 
female workers who work fulltime are treated as non-regular workers (so-called “quasi-part-
timers”; OECD, 1998). That being said, we will use this alternative identification strategy as a 
robustness check (section 5.5.1).  
  After having chosen our identification strategy, we run the estimation based on 
equation [16]. The estimated results are shown in Table 3. Column (2a) is the same as in 
Table 2, in which we can find a weakly negative correlation between separation rates and the 
predicted establishment fixed effect on average. When we divide the sample into two parts,   21 
following the switching equation reported in column (3c), this negative relation becomes 
stronger and gains statistical significance in type-I firms (3b), whereas it becomes rather small 
and statistically insignificant in type-II firms (3a). These results imply that we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that type-I firms resort to efficiency wages, whereas type-II firms do not. 
 
Table 3: Estimated Results of Switching Regression: Effect of Flow Structure on 
Predicted Establishment Fixed Effect 2005 BSWS and ETS matched sample 
(2a) (3a) (3b) (3c)
































































0.095 0.255 0.009 2.377
(0.016)
*** (0.012)
 *** -0.03 (0.018)
 ***

































Gross Flow Ratio Difference
between Male and Female
Predicted Establishment Fixed Effect
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimation includes year dummies. 
Gross flow ratio means inflow ratio plus outflow ratio. 
   22 
  The estimation is also consistent with the identification strategy: the difference 
between male and female gross flows affects the establishments’ probability to belong to the 
type-I firms negatively as well as significantly in the switching equation (column (3c) in table 
3), as expected. The estimation is also consistent with the existing literature on wage premium 
and firm size: male workers enjoy larger wage premium in larger firms regardless of their 
organizational structure, type-I or type-II (columns (3a) and (3b)). Interestingly, the estimated 
switching equation (column (3c)) implies that smaller firms are less likely to belong to type-I 
firms (compared with the largest firms), and that firms in the service industry are more likely 
to be of type-I (compared with those in the manufacturing industry).  
  As the switching equation (column (3c) in table 3) is a type of Probit model, we 
cannot distinguish the magnitude of the marginal effect of variables directly. Instead, Table 4 
decomposes  the sample according to  the  ex  post  estimated probability to be type-I, and 
confirms the difference of firm characteristics between more-likely-to-be-type-I firms and 
less-likely-to-be-type-I firms. As expected, the average wage premium is much larger in the 
more-likely-to be-type-I firms. The difference between gross flows of male and female 
workers is also smaller in the more-likely-to-be-type-I firms. It is also apparent that there are 
less small firms among the more-likely-to-be-type-I firms. For example, among the firms 
whose probability to belong to type I is more than median, the smaller firms (under 299 
employees) represent 22.7% against 26.3% in less-likely firms. The table also suggests that 
the relation between firm size and type of firm is non monotonous, implying that an a priori 
classification of type of firm would not have been appropriate. As for the industries, 
manufacturing industries have a  low probability of being type I  whereas high probability 
firms are characterized by a high share of service industry. 
 
Table 4: Average attributes between more-likely-to-be-type-II firms  
and more-likely-to-be-type-I firms   23 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
0.030 0.232 0.088 0.307
0.116 0.104 0.158 0.185
-0.027 0.243 -0.081 0.654
0.090 0.056 0.070 0.058






(Electric and Utilities) 0.076 0.000
(Transportation and Communication) 0.000 0.172
(Retail, Wholesales and Restaurants) 0.027 0.142
(Finance and Insurance) 0.002 0.092
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Prob. of Type-I
more than median of 
Prob. of Type-I
Variable




  Overall, the estimation of the system of equations supports the existence of efficiency 
wages in type-I firms and competitive wages in type-II firms. This result shows the usefulness 
of the unknown switching regression methodology à la Dickens & Lang. 
 
5.4 Implication for the evolution of the share of type-I firms 
A key mechanism of the theoretical model is the reallocation of firms from a type-I to 
a type-II organization when the economy is hit by a negative aggregate productivity shock 
(see Proposition 1). This section uses the result of the estimation to simulate the evolution of 
the share of type-I firms.
19
The probability of being a type-I firm is calculated as: 
 To do this, we feed the switching regression estimate (column (3c) 
in table 3) with public data from 1981 to 2005 to compute the probability to be a type-I firm.  
    [17] 
 
                                                 
19 Because of the lack of data, it is not possible to simulate the evolution of other variables such as wage 
differentials.    24 
where F is the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution, Kj is the difference between gross 
flows of male and female workers, and Zj are dummies for industry and firm size. In the 
sample used for the estimation, the mean (median) over the 9,007 establishments of this 
probability is 31% (13%). By using the number of male regular workers as weights, we can 
compute the share of type-I firms in the economy, measured by the number of male regular 
workers. In our sample, it is equal to 19%. 
To determine the evolution of the share of the type-I firms over time, we feed [17] 
with published ETS data that provide semi-aggregated worker flows by gender, firm size, and 
industry since 1981. If we assume that the switching equation has been stable over time, we 
can deduce the probability for the average firm to belong to type-I in a certain industry, for a 
certain size class and in a certain year. As the model predicts a shrinking share of type-I firms 
within a homogenous sector and for a given size (normalized to 1), the simulation has to 
abstract from changes in the composition of sector and size. To do this, we fix the 
composition of industry and firm-size as it was in 1981. More precisely, denote St1981 the 
average share of type-I firms at year t, based on the number of male regular workers of 
industry-firm size k in the year 1981 which we denote Mk1981. Kkt is the difference between 
aggregate gross worker flow of male and female, and Zkt are dummies for industry and firm 
size. St1981 is defined as follows:  
 
    (18) 
 
 
We refer to this first simulation as the within-group transition  and report our result in 
Figure 1A. To be complete, we also report in Figure 1B the total share of type-I firms when 
allowing the composition of industry and size to evolve over time (total transition).
20
                                                 
20 The total share St is defined as 
 In this 
second simulation, the evolution of the total share is affected by the distributional shift of 
workers from sector to sector and from size to size. Since, according to our results, firms in 
the service sector are more likely to adopt the efficiency wage scheme, the increasing share of 
the service industry over time is likely to lead to a larger total share of type-I firms.  
.   25 
Figure 1A shows the evolution of the simulated share of type-I firms between 1981 
and 2005 based on a fixed sectoral and size composition (St1981).
21
 
 The simulated share of 
type-I firms has decreased within group at the beginning of the Lost Decade, which confirms 
the prediction of the model.  
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Figure 1B shows the evolution of the simulated total share of type-I firm when 
allowing for changes in the industry-size composition. The total share in the simulation is 
about 25% in 2005, which is slightly higher than the share directly computed with the micro 
data, 19%. This difference, which could be due to aggregation errors, should make us cautious 
when interpreting the simulated probability based on aggregate data. The figure shows that 
changes in the composition of industry and firm-size led to an overall increase in the share of 
type-I firms within whole economy. While the first simulation provides an explanation for the 
rise of within-group wage differentials, this second simulation could explain widening 
between-group wage differentials. 
 
 

















































































                                                 
21 Data for 2003 are missing.   26 
 
 
5.5 Robustness of Switching Regression 
The existence of efficiency wages  is not contradicted by our estimations  so far. 
However, it is necessary to conduct some robustness checks to make this conclusion stronger. 
We first discuss the robustness of the switching equation, especially with regard to the 
identification strategy; then we discuss the robustness of the wage premium equation.  
 
5.5.1. Gross flow difference between regular workers and part-timers 
An  alternative  choice for the variable Kj  in  equation  [16]  is to use the gross flow 
difference between regular workers and part-timers. As we already explained, the drawback 
of this approach is the drastic decrease of the sample size. Table 5 shows the distribution of 
part-timer ratio. 
 
Table 5: Distribution of Part-timer Ratio 
BSWS 2005-2009 
  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Median  Max. 
Fraction of 
zero 
Total  266563  0.232  0.315  0  0.059  1  0.439 
Industry               
manufacturing  50980  0.115  0.207  0  0  1  0.541 
hotels and 
restraurants  33411  0.623  0.328  0  0.737  1  0.099 
Firm size               
Over 5000  29725  0.326  0.390  0  0.075  1  0.411 
100 to 299  38945  0.180  0.268  0  0.049  1  0.454 
5 to 9  38765  0.249  0.326  0  0.111  1  0.488 
   
 
  The sample mean of part-timer ratio per establishment is about 23%. However 44% of 
establishments do not use part-timers at all. Some service industries such as hotels and 
restaurants uses part-timers much more than manufacturing industries do. Moreover, part-
timers are likely to be concentrated in the very large and very small firms.
22
                                                 
22 This result is confirmed by the Diversification of Employment Forms survey, an establishment-based 
administrative survey conducted by the MHWL in 1994 and 2007. In the 75% of establishments in which full-
time regular employees are the major form of employment, they account for 92% of the total employment; in the 
20% of establishments where part-time employees constitute the major form of employment, they account for 
almost 2/3 of the establishment employment. To put it differently, part-time workers are concentrated on few 
establishments.  
 Therefore, if we   27 
use the difference between gross flows of full-timers and part-timers, we lose much of the 
sample size and the remaining sample will be biased towards some particular sectors.   
  Regardless of these drawbacks, Table 6 displays the estimated results of equation (16), 
when using the difference between gross flows of full-timers and part-timers. As we expected, 
with one third less of sample size, the resulting estimation does not distinguish as well as 
before type-I from type-II firms. However, results from of pooled OLS (6d) still show the 
slightly negative relation between the inflow ratio and the wage premium as a whole. The 
switching equation (6c) which uses the gross flow difference between regular workers and 
part-timers yields a similar result as in table 3. Contrary to the results we showed in table 3, 
the outflow ratio in type-II firms now also negatively affects the wage premium in (6a). 
Nonetheless, the magnitude of the effect is much smaller than for type-I firms. Overall, the 
change of the identification key does not substantially alter our results. 
 
Table6: Summary of Estimated Results of Switching Regression: Effect of Gross 
Flow Difference between Regular workers and Part-timers: 2005-2009 BSWS and 
ETS matched sample 
  (6d)  (6a)  (6b)  (6c) 
  Pooled OLS  Type-II firms  Type-I firms  Switch 
Dependent Variables  Predicted Establishment Fixed Effect  (latent) 







Gross Flow Ratio 
Difference between 
Regular and Part-timer 
      -0.228  
(0.002)*** 








Observations  5898 
R-squared  0.27  0.46  0.16  0.97 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimation includes industry, firm size, 
year dummies and overtime ratio. Gross flow ratio means inflow ratio plus outflow ratio. 
 
5.5.2. Wage premium equation: on-the-job search and composition effect 
The estimation of the wage premium equation may have been affected by two other 
mechanisms. First of all, as recalled in section 3, a mechanism of on-the-job search may also 
explain the observed negative relation between wage premium and gross flows at the micro 
level. Because incumbents can look for a job elsewhere, employers have an incentive to retain 
them with higher wages, which results in both of a higher wage premium and a lower labor 
flow. To control for this potential bias, we use the outflow ratio of voluntary quits as an 
additional control variable.
    28 
Second, in the actual workplace, fluctuations in gross flows may introduce a change in 
the composition of the company’s workforce; for example, when hiring decreases, the average 
age and tenure of workers may increase as a result of reducing younger new-comers. In the 
estimation, we assume that the observable attributes of human capital solely determine the 
hourly base wage, and any change in the workforce composition does not affect the residual 
of wage equations. However, if the company uses deferred payment schemes, in which 
workers receive wage premium in the later period of career, any temporal decrease of younger 
workers’ share in hiring will cross-sectionally produce a higher average wage premium, even 
though this change in the composition of the workforce will not alter the aggregated wage 
premium through lifetime. Since our dataset is built on cross-sectional survey, the 
unobservable deviation of each establishment from the cross-sectional mean may come from a 
temporal imbalance of workers’ composition. To account for this, we use the difference 
between the average age of stock and inflows. 
 
Table 7: Robustness Check of Switching Regression: 
2005-2009 BSWS and ETS matched sample 
  (7a)  (7b)  (7c)  (7d) 
  Type-II firms  Type-I firms  Type-II firms  Type-I firms 
















   
   













Observations  9007 
R-squared  0.46  0.16  0.47  0.17 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Other explanatory variable includes 
overtime ratio, 4 firm size dummies, 9 industry dummies and year dummies. The probability weight to belong to 
each sector is re-estimated as in (3c). 
 
  Results are shown from columns (7a) to (7d) of Table 7. It appears that extra variables, 
which control for on-the-job search incentives and potential composition change, do not alter 
the main part of the results. The coefficients of gross inflow remain negative in type-I firms 
and close to zero in type-II firms. In (7b), the coefficient of the composition effect is positive, 
which means that when incumbents are older than newly hired employees, the average wage   29 
premium grows. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient is only statistically significant in type-
I firms, showing that this effect matters only for a specific type of firms. This finding is 
consistent with the long-term employment practices in Japan (Ishikawa & Dejima, 1994). The 
ratio of voluntary quits negatively affects the wage premium, which is consistent with on-the-
job search models. After controlling for on-the-job search incentives, gross inflow still affects 
the wage premium negatively and significantly in type-I firms. Overall, these results show the 




In this paper, we have proposed a framework aiming at connecting two major stylized 
facts that characterized the Japanese economy during the Lost Decade (1992-2004): rising 
wage inequalities and increasing productivity differentials. After having documented these 
stylized facts  and  having  reviewed possible theoretical explanations, we have proposed a 
simple efficiency wage model with one sector but two types of firms of similar size: in one 
type of firms, which provide job security and adopt  an  efficiency wage scheme with 
endogenous effort, the productivity is assumed to depend on the effort provided by workers, 
while in the other type of firms, characterized by a competitive labor market, productivity is 
exogenous. The prediction of the  model is that a negative aggregate  productivity shock 
produces increasing productivity and wage differentials, as well as a falling share of type-I 
firms.  
The core of our paper is then an empirical investigation of the Japanese labor market 
with micro data. For the first time, we merge two databases, the Basic Survey on Wage 
Structure and the Employment Trend Survey for the years 2005-2009. This matched worker-
firm cross-section dataset allows us to get information on (hourly) wages, hiring  and 
separation rates and provides many control variables for firms (size, sector) and for workers 
(age, gender, education). The existence of efficiency wages mechanisms on average, detected 
by a negative correlation between the firm-specific wage premium and workers flows, is not 
contradicted by our data. Moreover, in dividing our sample of establishments into two groups 
by using the unknown regime switching regression à la Dickens and Lang, we find that one 
group of establishments can be characterized by efficiency wages, whereas the other group 
cannot. Further robustness checks and a simulation confirm that efficiency wages and the 
heterogeneity of firms with regards to their work organization is a plausible explanation for 
the joint rise in productivity and wage differentials in Japan in recent years.   30 
Important implications can be drawn from this paper. First of all, we confirm that 
rising wage inequalities in Japan can be related to increasing productivity dispersion among 
firms. Second, we show that developments related to the labor market can generate rising 
wage inequalities, without resorting to hypotheses regarding skill-biased technical change or 
globalization.  
At the same time, several limitations of the paper open future avenues for research. 
First, data availability limited our study to cross-sectional data and prevented us to directly 
observe the evolution of between-firm wage and productivity differential. Second, while the 
paper focuses on between-firm wage differentials, a future extension should decompose 
precisely the overall wage differentials into within-firms and between-firms components. Last, 
the aim of the simple model we introduced in this paper was to illustrate how an efficiency 
wage mechanism may generate productivity and wage differentials in the case of an 
exogenous aggregate shock. A natural next step would be to conduct a quantitative analysis in 




Abe M. & Ohashi I. (2004) ‘Inter-Industry and Firm Size Effects on Wage Differentials and 
Efficiency Wages in Japan’,  Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series No. 25, Hitotsubashi 
University.  
Abowd J. M., Finer H. & Kramarz F. (1999) ‘Individual and Firm Heterogeneity in 
Compensation: An Analysis of Matched Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data for the 
State of Washington’, in J. Haltiwanger, J. Lane, J. Spletzer, K. Troske (eds.),  The 
Creation and Analysis of Employer-Employee Matched Data, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 
3--24. 
Abowd J. M. & Kramarz F. (2001) ‘Inter-industry Wage Differentials in France and in the 
United States’, Cornell University Working Paper. 
Abowd, J. M., Kramarz F. & S. Roux (2006) ‘Wages, Mobility, and Firm Performance: 
Advantages and Insights from Using Matched Worker-Firm Data’, Economic Journal, 
116: 245--285. 
Abraham K. & Houseman S. N. (1989) ‘Job security and work force adjustment: How 
different are U.S. and Japanese practices?’, Journal of the Japanese and International 
Economies, 3 (4): 500--521.    31 
Amable B. & Gatti D. (2004) ‘Product market competition, job security and aggregate 
employment’, Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4): 667--686. 
Askenazy P. (2004), ‘Shorter Work Time, Hours Flexibility, and Labor Intensification’, 
Eastern Economic Journal, 30 (4): 603--614.  
Bloom N. & J. van Reenen (2011) ‘Human Resource Management and Productivity’, Chapter 
19 in Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 4B: 1697--1767. 
Bloom, N. and J. van Reenen (2007) ‘Measuring and explaining management practices across 
firms and countries’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4): 1351--1408. 
Bulow J. I. & Summers L. H. (1986) ‘A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to 
Industrial Policy, Discrimination and Keynesian Unemployment’,  Journal of Labor 
Economics, 4(3): 376--414. 
Caselli F. (1999) ‘Technological Revolutions’, American Economic Review, 89(1): 78-102. 
Dickens W. T. & Lang K. (1985) ‘A Test Of Dual Labor Market Theory’,  American 
Economic Review, 75(4), 792--805. 
Dinardo J., Fortin N. & Lemieux T. (1996) ‘Labor market institutions and the distribution of 
wages, 1973-1992: a semi-parametric approach’, Econometrica, 64(5): 1001--1044. 
Dosi G., Lechevalier S. & A. Secchi (2010) ‘Inter-firm heterogeneity: nature, sources and 
consequences for industrial dynamics. An introduction’,  Industrial and Corporate 
Change, 2010, 19 (6): 1867--1890. 
Dunne T., Foster L., Haltiwanger J. & Troske K. (2004) ‘Wage and Productivity Dispersion 
in the US Manufacturing: the Role of Computer Investment’,  Journal of Labor 
Economics, 22(2): 397--430. 
Faggio G., Salvanes K. G. & Van Reenen  J. (2010) ‘The Evolution of Inequality in 
Productivity and Wages: Panel Data Evidence’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 19 (6): 
1919-1951. 
Fuess S. M. & M. Millea (2002) ‘Do Employers Pay Efficiency Wages? Evidence from 
Japan’, Journal of Labor Research 23 (2): 279--292. 
Fujimura H. (2003) ‘Changes in the Spring Wage Offensive and the Future of the Wage 
Determination System in Japanese Firms’, Japan Labor Bulletin, May. 
Fukao K. & Kwon H. U. (2006) ‘Why did Japan.s TFP Growth Slow Down in the Lost 
Decade? An Empirical Analysis Based on Firm-Level Data of Manufacturing Firms’, 
Japanese Economic Review, 57(2):195--228. 
Fukao K. & Miyagawa T. (2007) ‘Productivity in Japan, the US, and the Major EU 
Economies: Is Japan Falling Behind?’, RIETI Discussion papers series n°2007-046.   32 
Green F. (2004) ‘Why Has Work Effort Become More Intense?’,  Industrial relations. A 
Journal of Economy and Society, 43 (4): 709--741.  
Haltiwanger John C., Lane Julia I. & Spletzer James R. (1999) ‘Productivity Differences 
Across Employers: The Roles of Employer Size, Age and Human Capital’, American 
Economic Review, 89(2): 94--98. 
Hayashi, F. and E. C. Prescott (2002) ‘The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade’,  Review of 
Economic Dynamics, 5 (1): 206--235. 
Houseman S. N. & K. Abraham (1993) ‘Female Workers as a Buffer in the Japanese 
Economy’, American Economic Review, 83 (2): 45--51. 
Ishikawa T. & Dejima T. (1994) ‘The Dual Structure of Labor Markets’, in T. Ishikawa (ed.), 
The distribution of wealth and income in Japan, Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 
pp.169--209. (in Japanese). 
Ito K. & Lechevalier S. (2009) ‘The Evolution of Productivity Dispersion of firms. A 
Reevaluation of its determinants in the case of Japan’, Review of World Economics, 145 
(3): 405--429. 
Ito K. & Lechevalier  S.  (2010)  ‘Why Some Firms Persistently Out-Perform Others? 
Investigating the Interactions Between Innovation and Exporting Strategies’, Industrial 
and Corporate Change, 19 (6): 1997--2039. 
Kambayashi R., Kawaguchi D. & Yokoyama I. (2008) ‘Wage Distribution in Japan, 1989-
2003’,  Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’économie, 41(4): 1329--
1350. 
Layard R., Nickell S. & Jackman R. (2005) Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance 
and the Labour Market, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lazear E.P. & K. L. Shaw (2008) The structure of wages. An international Comparison, 
NBER, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Leamer E. E. (1999) ‘Effort, Wages, and the International Division of Labor’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 107 (6): 1127--1162. 
Lechevalier S. (2005),  Will Toyota Save Japan (and the World…)?, Jouy en Josas: HEC 
Eurasia Institute. 
Leonardi M. (2007) ‘Firm Heterogeneity in Capital/labor Ratios and Wage Inequality’, 
Economic Journal, 117(518): 375--398. 
Machin S. (2008) ‘An Appraisal of Economic Research on Changes in Wage Inequality’, 
Labour, 22 (s1): 7--26.   33 
Mikitani R. & Posen A. S. (eds.) (2000) Japan’s Financial Crisis and Its Parallels to US 
experience, Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, Special report 13. 
Mortensen D. T. & C. A. Pissarides (1994) ‘Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory 
of Unemployment’, Review of Economic Studies, 61(3): 397--415. 
Mortensen D. T. (2003) Wage Dispersion, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
OECD (1998) Labour Policies for Part-time workers in Japan: Changing Labour Market and 
Gender Equality: The Role of Policy, Manuscript for conference in Norway, Oslo, 12 and 
13 October 1998. 
OECD (2006) Economic Survey of Japan, Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2010) ‘Activation Policies in Japan’,  OECD Social, Employment and Migration 
Working Papers No.113. 
Ohtake F. (2005) Inequality in Japan, Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun (in Japanese). 
Oi W. Y. (1983) ‘Heterogeneous Firms and the Organization of Production’,  Economic-
Inquiry; 21(2): 147--71. 
Ota K. (2005) ‘Rise in Labour Income Inequality with Increasing Numbers of Freeters’, ESRI 
Discussion Paper Series No 140 (in Japanese). 
Shapiro C. & Stiglitz J. (1984) ‘Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device’, 
American Economic Review, 74(3): 433--44. 
Sousa-Poza A. (2004) ‘Is the Swiss Labor Market Segmented? An Analysis Using Alternative 
Approaches’, Labour, 18(1): 131--161. 
Tachibanaki T. (2005) Confronting Income Inequality in Japan: A Comparative Analysis of 
Causes, Consequences, and Reform, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Valeyre  A. (2004) ‘Forms of work intensification and economic performance in French 
manufacturing’, Eastern Economic Journal 30 (4): 643--658. 
Wakisaka A. (1997) ‘Women at Work’, in Sako M. & Sato H. (ed.), Japanese labour and 
management in transition: diversity,  flexibility and participation,  London:  Routledge: 
131--150. 





Appendix A: derivation of some results of the model 
Wages in type-I and type-II firms   34 
Here, we display dynamic equations for the utilities of shirking (
S V1 ) and non-shirking 
workers (
NS V1 ) employed in type-I firms, along with the utilities of the unemployed (
U V ) and 
workers employed in type-II firms ( 2 V ): 
) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1
NS U NS V V s e t w rV − + − − =  
) )( ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1
S U S V V q s t w rV − + + − =  
] ) , [max( 1 1
U S NS
u
U V V V a w rV − + =  
) 1 ( 2 2 t w rV − =  
As it is optimal for firms that workers never shirk (otherwise, production would be 
zero), they choose a wage such that 
S NS V V 1 1 = . From this no-shirking condition, we obtain the 
standard incentive-compatible real wage schedule (the efficiency wage) applying to workers 
















Because jobs in type-II firms are perfectly competitive, workers are indifferent 
between working in a type-II firm or being unemployed. Therefore,  2 V V
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Proof of proposition 1 
The free entry conditions [13] and [14], together with the expression of the wage 
differential [11] give the following equation:  
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where e, which is a function of a, follows from [8]. Equation [A1] determines the equilibrium 






























































1 ) ~ 1 (
1
) ~ 1 (
1
1 ~
a a A .   35 
This equation implicitly defines a function f such that  1 )
~
( ~ − = A f a . It is easy to show that f is 
strictly increasing and maps (1,+ ∞)  into  (1 ,+∞).  When  1
~
> A , the hiring rate a ~  is strictly 







 is also strictly 
increasing.
23






























which is a decreasing function of A
~
 (and hence of A). The wage rates w1 and w2 follow from 
[13] and [14]. From [11], the wage differential w1−w2, which is also equal to the productivity 
differential m1−m2, is strictly increasing in e and therefore strictly decreasing in A.  
The unemployment allowance wu follows from [9] and can be shown to be equal to 

















































The second factor on the right-hand side is strictly decreasing and goes to +∞ when  A
~
 goes to 
1 and to −1 when  A
~
 goes to +∞. Therefore, it has a unique zero  A on (1,+∞). When  A A <
~
, L2 
is strictly positive. The ratio L2/L1 is a strictly decreasing function of A
~
 on  ) , 1 ( A , so that 
L1/L2 is strictly increasing in  A
~
 and A.  
 
 
Appendix B: the dataset – matching BSWS individual survey and ETS establishment survey 
The key issue in the construction of our matched employees-employers dataset is the 
size of the sample after matching. 
  BSWS individual survey is a sample survey of individual workers conducted by 
MHLW (Ministry of labor, health, and welfare), once a year, at the end of June. It covers 
private establishments over 5 employees and public establishments over 10 employees. All 
industries other than agriculture are surveyed. Workers are re-sampled within an 
establishment. The sample size is about 78,000 establishments and 1.6 million workers per 
year. The most important feature for us is rich data on wages. 
                                                 
23 A formal proof is available from the authors upon request.   36 
  ETSis an establishment survey conducted by MHLW, twice a year, at the end of June 
and December. It covers public and private establishments with more than 5 employees in all 
industries, except agriculture. Individual recently separated and newly hired workers (within 
the sampling period) are re-sampled within an establishment. The sample size is about 10,000 
establishments, with 80,000 hirings and 90,000 separations per year. The survey gives 
detailed information on new entrants and separations. 
  We match these two surveys, year by year, at establishment level by using a key 
provided by the Ministry. Although the size of the matched sample is 12,100, we found some 
possible inconsistencies in the data. The data point of BSWS is the end of June, and that of 
the second wave of ETS is the beginning of July (day following the data point of BSWS). We 
proceed to a sample restriction as follows: 
- 9 establishments are excluded due to the negative employment stock at the beginning of 
July; 
-  1,209 establishments are excluded due to the inconsistency of industry classification 
between BSWS and the second ETS; 
- 1,747 establishments are excluded due to the inconsistency of firm size and establishment 
size classifications between BSWS and the second ETS; 
- 126 establishments are excluded due to the inconsistency of employment data between the 
first and the second ETS. 
- 2 establishments are excluded due to perfectly predict success or failure in the dependent 
variable along with their associated observations. Dropping perfectly predicted observations 
has no effect on the likelihood or estimates of the remaining and increases the numerical 
stability of the optimization process. 
As a result, the final size of the matched sample is 9,007 establishments. For the 
BSWS, the matching rate is only 3.4% but from the point of view of ETS, it is 15.9%, which 
is quite acceptable. Finally, please note that this restriction is very conservative in that there is 
a possibility for an establishment to move to another classification at the beginning of July. 
 
 
Appendix C: Summary Statistics for the dataset   37 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
0.060 0.274 -1.250 1.641
0.137 0.153 0.000 6.000
-0.054 0.502 -16.000 9.414
0.080 0.058 0.000 0.446
(over 1000) 0.558 0 1
(300-999) 0.196 0 1
(100-299) 0.155 0 1
(30-99) 0.090 0 1
(Mining) 0.013 0 1
(Manufacturing) 0.508 0 1
(Electric and Utilities) 0.038 0 1
(Transportation and Communication) 0.086 0 1
(Retail, Wholesales and Restaurants) 0.084 0 1
(Finance and Insurance) 0.047 0 1
(Real Estates) 0.026 0 1
(Service) 0.198 0 1
2005 0.219 0 1
2006 0.219 0 1
2007 0.204 0 1
2008 0.168 0 1
2009 0.202 0 1
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Appendix D: Summary Statistics for Gross Flow Rate by Gender, 2005-2009 BSWS and 
ETS matched sample  
 
  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Median  Max. 
Male  9007  0.278  0.312  0  0.212  12 
Female  9007  0.332  0.570  0  0.237  16 
 